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PROBABILITY THEORY WITHOUT BAYES’ RULE
By Samuel G. Rodriques∗,†
Department of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Within the Kolmogorov theory of probability, Bayes’ rule allows
one to perform statistical inference by relating conditional probabil-
ities to unconditional probabilities. As we show here, however, there
is a continuous set of alternative inference rules that yield the same
results, and that may have computational or practical advantages for
certain problems. We formulate generalized axioms for probability
theory, according to which the reverse conditional probability distri-
bution P (B|A) is not specified by the forward conditional probabil-
ity distribution P (A|B) and the marginals P (A) and P (B). Thus,
in order to perform statistical inference, one must specify an addi-
tional “inference axiom,” which relates P (B|A) to P (A|B), P (A),
and P (B). We show that when Bayes’ rule is chosen as the inference
axiom, the axioms are equivalent to the classical Kolmogorov axioms.
We then derive consistency conditions on the inference axiom, and
thereby characterize the set of all possible rules for inference. The
set of “first-order” inference axioms, defined as the set of axioms in
which P (B|A) depends on the first power of P (A|B), is found to be
a 1-simplex, with Bayes’ rule at one of the extreme points. The other
extreme point, the “inversion rule,” is studied in depth.
1. Introduction. Let A andB be random variables taking values a1, . . . , aNA
and b1, . . . , bNB , respectively, and let P (ai, bj) be the joint probability dis-
tribution for A and B, which may be represented as a matrix P(A,B) of
size NA × NB. The conditional probability distribution P (ai|bj) may like-
wise be represented as an NA×NB matrix, denoted P(A|B), with the i,jth
component given according to the standard Kolmogorov axioms of proba-
bility Kolmogorov [1933] by
(1) P (ai, bj) = P (ai|bj)P (bj).
In the Kolmogorov framework, P (ai, bj) is viewed as the measure of the
intersection of sets representing ai and bj. It thus follows from the symmetry
of the intersection operator that P (ai, bj) = P (bj , ai). From the definition
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of conditional probabilities we can thus derive Bayes’ rule, which gives the
relationship between P (A|B) and P (B|A):
(2) P (ai|bj) =
P (bj |ai)P (ai)
P (bj)
.
However, Bayes’ rule gives rise to some surprising behavior. By unitarity
and additivity, it follows that
(3) P (ai) =
∑
j
P (ai, bj),
and hence
(4) P (ai) =
∑
j
P (ai|bj)P (bj).
Equation 4 is simply the statement that the vector ~P (A) with components
P (ai) is obtained from the vector ~P (B) with components P (bj) by the action
of P(A|B). Likewise for B, we have
(5) P (bj) =
∑
i
P (bj |ai)P (ai).
By substitution, it follows that
(6) P (bk) =
∑
ij
P (bk|ai)P (ai|bj)P (bj).
Given P(A|B), equation 6 must hold for all choices of the probability dis-
tribution ~P (B). One natural conclusion would be that P(A|B) and P(B|A)
are inverses, i.e.,
(7)
∑
i
P (bk|ai)P (ai|bj) = δkj.
However, the matrix inverse of P(A|B) will have negative values and values
greater than 1 in general. Instead, given constant P(A|B), P(B|A) varies
with ~P (B) according to Bayes’ rule, in such a way that ~P (B) is always an
eigenvalue of the matrix P(B|A)P(A|B) with eigenvalue 1. This situation is
particularly dissatisfying when one thinks of P(A|B) as describing the action
of a channel, in which case P(B|A) would describe the result of running the
channel backwards. In this case, Bayes’ rule does not allow a simultaneous
description of the forward channel and the reverse channel independent of
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the distribution that goes through it. One imagines that the matrix inverse
might be a more appropriate description of the reverse channel than the
matrix P(B|A) obtained via Bayes’ rule.
The matrix inverse ofP(A|B) shows up in other ways as well. For example,
suppose we are given ~P (A) and P(A|B), and wish to infer ~P (B). This task is
not possible using Bayes’ rule, since P(B|A) depends on ~P (B); one requires
a prior distribution. Nonetheless, ~P (B) may always be obtained from ~P (A)
via the inverse of the matrix P(A|B):
(8) ~P (B) = P(A|B)−1 ~P (A).
Within the strict framework of Kolmogorov probability theory, one must
view this procedure as a coincidence, since the matrix P (A|B)−1 is not a
conditional probability distribution.
As we show here, the application of P(A|B)−1 in this way may be ex-
plained using an alternative axiomatization of probability theory in which
Bayes’ rule is replaced by the requirement that
(9) P(B|A) = P(A|B)−1,
referred to as the “inversion rule.” Moreover, the inversion rule is only one of
a continuous set of possible alternative axiomatizations of probability theory,
each of which comes with its own rule for statistical inference. In the second
section, we provide the general axiomatic framework for probability theory
that we will consider in the remainder of the paper. In the third section,
we explore the specific axiom that gives rise to equation (9) as a rule for
inference, and show how it may be used alongside Bayes’ rule in practice.
Finally, in the fourth section, we characterize the set of all possible inference
rules. We find that Bayes’ rule and the inversion rule form a conjugate pair,
and that they can be used to generate all other rules for inference.
2. Axioms. We seek to formulate a set of axioms that preserves the
notion of a probability distribution in its entirety without Bayes’ rule. Since
Bayes’ rule is a consequence of the symmetry of the intersection operator, it
is necessary to replace Kolmogorov’s axiomatization in terms of set theory
by a similar axiomatization in terms of sequences. The primary hurdle will
be to establish analogs of the union and intersection operators for sequences,
which is necessary to facilitate comparison with the Kolmogorov axioms.
We consider the case of N random variables A(1), . . . , A(N), where A(i)
takes values aij ∈ Ji, for j = 1, . . . ,Mi. Let S be the set of all permutations
of the integers from 1 to N . Given some s ∈ S, we denote by Es the set of
all sequences Q of N elements such that the ith element in Q is in Js(i). Q
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is then said to have order s. Given sequences Q and Q′, Q is said to be a
subsequence of Q′ if Q may be obtained by removing elements from Q′. We
denote by Fs the set of all subsequences of elements of Es. A sequence Q is
then said to have order s if it is in Fs. For any sequence Q, we denote by
Q¯ the set of elements appearing at some position in Q, referred to as the
“membership set” of Q. We write Q ⊆s Q
′ if Q and Q′ both have order s,
and if Q¯ ⊆ Q¯′.
For any Q ∈ Fs, we define Rs(Q) to be the set of sequences in Es of which
Q is a subsequence, i.e.,
(10) Rs(Q) ≡ {Q
′ ∈ Es|Q ⊆s Q
′}.
We may now evidently define the operator ∩s such that for all Q1, Q2 ∈ Fs,
(11) Q1 ∩s Q2 = {Q
′ ∈ Rs(Q1) ∩Rs(Q2)}.
Likewise, we define the operator ∪s such that for all Q1, Q2 ∈ Fs,
(12) Q1 ∪s Q2 = {Q
′ ∈ Rs(Q1) ∪Rs(Q2)}.
The axioms are then as follows, and are formulated for the greatest simi-
larity to the original axioms of Kolmogorov:
Axiom 2.1. For all s ∈ S and for all Q ∈ Es, P (Q) is a real-valued
function referred to as the probability of Q.
Axiom 2.2. For all s ∈ S and for all Q ∈ Fs,
(13) P (Q) =
∑
Q′∈Rs(Q)
P (Q′).
Crucially, we note that because P is not explicitly a function of s, ax-
iom 2.2 implies that for all s,s′ ∈ S and for all Q ∈ Fs ∩ Fs′ ,
(14)
∑
Q′∈Rs(Q)
P (Q′) = P (Q) =
∑
Q′∈R
s′ (Q)
P (Q′).
Equation 14 is equivalent to the statement that the marginal probability
distribution over a subset of variables depends only on the marginal ordering
of the variables in the subset.
Axiom 2.3. For all s ∈ S, we have
(15) P (Es) = 1.
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Axiom 2.4. For all Q1, Q2 ∈ Fs such that Rs(Q1) ∩Rs(Q2) = φ,
(16) P (Q1 ∪s Q2) = P (Q1) + P (Q2).
For any given value of s, the axioms 2.1 through 2.4 are identical to the
standard statement of Kolmogorov’s axioms without the requirement that
P (Q) be non-negative. Thus, the axioms are consistent, but not complete.
For the sake of concreteness, we will henceforth focus on the case of two
variables, A and B, so that there are only two orderings. Then a conditional
probability may be easily defined1:
(17) P (ai|bj) ≡
P (ai, bj)
P (bj)
.
Note that the ordering of the variables should be read off from right to left,
so P (ai, bj) is the probability of observing ai and bj relative to the ordering
in which B precedes A. This convention has been chosen to keep with the
standard convention for conditional probabilities, according to which the
conditioning variables are written on the right, and the conditioned variables
are written on the left.
We are interested in our ability to perform statistical inference within
this system of axioms. In the problem of statistical inference, we consider an
observable variable A and a hidden variable B. The goal is to determine a
posterior for the hidden variable, P (bj |ai), in terms of a model, P (ai|bj), and
a prior, P (bj). Within the current axiomatic system, the posterior distribu-
tion P (bj |ai) is constrained in terms of P (ai|bj) and P (bj) via equation 14,
which applied to the current system becomes
(18)
∑
j
P (ai, bj) = P (ai) =
∑
j
P (bj , ai).
However, this constraint does not specify P (bj |ai) uniquely in terms of
P (ai|bj). Thus, in order to perform statistical inference, it is necessary to
impose an additional “inference axiom” that provides us with a rule for in-
ferring P (bj |ai) in terms of P (ai|bj) and P (bj). Bayes’ rule is one possible
rule of inference, and may be recovered from the current axiomatization by
requiring that the joint probability over some set of variables is independent
of the ordering of those variables2, in which case P (ai, bj) = P (bj , ai) for all
1The conditional probability may be easily defined in the same way for any number of
variables, but the notation required to treat the general case is very cumbersome, so has
been avoided here.
2In the general formalism, the axiom is that for all Q ∈ Es and Q
′ ∈ Es′ such that
Q¯ = Q¯′, P (Q) = P (Q′).
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i and j, and hence
(19) P (bj , ai) = P (ai|bj)
P (bj)
P (ai)
.
As we show below, however, there are many other choices of inference axioms
that will nonetheless yield correct results.
In all that follows, we will assume that P(A|B) is invertible, which ensures
that the problem of inference will be uniquely solvable.
3. The Inversion Rule. Before examining the set of all possible in-
ference axioms, it will be useful to examine one particular inference rule,
the inversion rule, in depth. The inversion rule is given by equation (9), and
is noteworthy for being the only inference rule in which P(B|A) is speci-
fied exclusively in terms of P(A|B). It is thus associated with the following
inference axiom:
Axiom 3.1. P(A|B) and P(B|A) may be specified independently of
~P (B) and ~P (A).
We prove that this axiom uniquely specifies the inversion rule as follows:
Theorem 1 (Inversion Theorem). For all non-product distributions P (A,B),
the matrices P(A|B)P(B|A) and P(B|A)P(A|B) are equal to the identities
of size NA and NB respectively.
Proof. From the definition of conditional probability, we have
(20) P (ai) =
∑
j
P (ai|bj)P (bj),
and
(21) P (bj) =
∑
k
P (bj |ak)P (ak).
From eq. (14), we have
(22) P (ai) =
∑
j,k
P (ai|bj)P (bj |ak)P (ak).
Eq. (22) may be recast in matrix form as
(23) ~P (A) = P(A|B)P(B|A)~P (A).
Equation 23 must hold for all choices of ~P (A). However, P(A|B)P(B|A) is
independent of ~P (A) by axiom 3.1. It follows that P(A|B)P(B|A) must be
the identity. The proof for P(B|A)P(A|B) is identical.
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Equation (23) may in general still be applied even ifP(A,B) does not have
full rank by restricting the inversion to the support of P(A,B). However,
when P(A,B) is a product distribution, all quantities associated with all
other orderings of the variables are undefined. In the case of a product
distribution, it is impossible to decouple P(A|B) from ~P (A) since P (ai|bj) =
P (ai) for all j, so axiom 3.1 is inconsistent with the other axioms.
The joint distributions for the two different orderings may be related as
follows:
Theorem 2. Let P(A,B) be a non-product joint distribution. Then,
(24) P(B,A) = P(B)P(A,B)−1P(A).
Proof. Combining (23) with the definition of conditional probability, it
is clear that
(25) P(A|B) = P(A,B)P(B)−1
and
(26) P(B|A) = P(B,A)P(A)−1.
Inverting (25) and equating the left-hand sides of the two equations, we
obtain
P(B,A)P(A)−1 = P(B)P(A,B)−1,
from which it follows that
(27) P(B,A) = P(B)P(A,B)−1P(A).
Clearly, if all the entries ofP(A,B) are positive then the entries ofP(B,A)
will neither be strictly positive nor smaller than 1 in general.
A further interesting consequence of Theorem 2 is that the function P
is completely specified by the joint distribution for only a single order, and
hence contains the same amount of information as the joint distribution in
the Kolmogorov framework. More generally, as long as the chosen inference
axiom specifies P(B|A) completely in terms of P(A|B) and P(B), P(B,A)
will be completely specified in terms of P(A,B). For this reason, we are
always free to choose a preferred ordering of the variables, relative to which
all joint, conditional, and marginal probabilities agree with the Kolmogorov
probabilities:
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Corollary 1. Let PK be a non-product probability distribution obeying
the Kolmogorov axioms of probability. Then there exists a probability distri-
bution PI obeying axioms 2.1 through 2.4 and 3.1 such that for all i and j,
PK(ai, bj) = PI(ai, bj).
Corollary 1 allows us to use the inversion rule to perform statistical in-
ference on Kolmogorov probabilities as follows. Given a model PK(A|B)
and an empirical estimate P˜K(A) for ~PK(A), we consider the probabil-
ity distribution PI(A,B) in the inversion framework, defined such that
PI(A,B) = PK(A,B). Then, the best empirical estimate for P˜I(B) using
the inversion rule is given by
P˜I(B) = PI(B|A)P˜I(A)
= PI(A|B)
−1P˜I(A)
= PK(A|B)
−1P˜K(A)(28)
Furthermore, in the limit as P˜K(A) → ~PK(A), the estimate P˜I(B) obvi-
ously converges to ~PI(B). Because ~PI(B) = ~PK(B), we may interpret P˜I(B)
as an approximation to P˜K(B):
(29) P˜K(B) = PK(A|B)
−1P˜K(A).
Equation 29 cannot be justified on the basis of the axioms of Kolmogorov
probability theory. In the Kolmogorov framework, equation 8 can only be
used to relate the specific distributions ~PK(A) and ~PK(B). Because PK(A|B)
−1
is not a conditional probability distribution, there is no guarantee that
P˜K(B) obtained using (29) is a probability distribution. Nonetheless, using
the inversion framework, we have proven the validity of (29) as a method of
performing inference.
One interpretation of the preceding discussion is that it is possible to use
the inversion rule to infer a prior from the data. Surprisingly, because the
inversion rule and Bayes’ rule are independent, one may then apply Bayes’
rule to do Bayesian inference using the inferred prior. We have
P˜K(B|A) = P˜(B)PK(A|B)
T
P˜(A)−1
= Diag
[
PK(A|B)
−1P˜ (A)
]
PK(A|B)
T
P˜(A)−1(30)
Here, Diag [~v] is the diagonal matrix with the entries of ~v along the diagonal.
The estimate P˜K(B|A) converges to PK(B|A) as P˜ (A)→ ~P (A), so P˜ (B) is
guaranteed to be a “good” prior, even if it is not a Kolmogorov probability
distribution.
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4. All Possible Inference Axioms. We now examine the set of all
possible inference axioms that can be added to axioms 2.1 through 2.4. An
inference axiom is any way of specifying P(B|A) in terms of P(A|B) and
~P (B). For an inference axiom to be consistent with axioms 2.1 through 2.4,
the matrix P(B|A) must satisfy equation 18. For equation 18 to be satisfied,
the columns of P(B|A) must sum to 1, and the marginal distributions must
not depend on the order of the joint distribution over which one chooses to
marginalize. From this latter requirement and the definition of conditional
probabilities, we derive the requirement that
(31) ~P (B) = P(B|A)P(A|B)~P (B).
Multiplying both sides by P(B|A)−1, we obtain
(32) P(B|A)−1 ~P (B) = P(A|B)~P (B).
Because the right-hand side is equal to ~P (A), we can multiply both sides by
P(A)−1, obtaining
(33) P(A)−1P(B|A)−1 ~P (B) = ~1A,
where ~1A is the vector of 1s with support equal to the support of ~P (A). We
define R by
(34) P(B|A)−1 = P(A)R P(B)−1.
Substituting equation (34) into (33), we obtain
(35) R~1B = ~1A.
For any matrix R obeying (35) for all choices of P(B) and P(A|B), there is
definition of P(B|A) that satisfies (18), given by
(36) P(B|A) = P(B)R−1P(A)−1.
In retrospect, equation 36 is obvious. For all choices of P(A) and P(B),
P(B|A) must map ~P (A) onto ~P (B). This requirement is clearly satisfied
only if the matrix R given in (36) maps ~1B onto ~1A. For the columns of
P(B|A) to sum to 1, we further require3
(37) P(B|A)T~1B = ~1A.
3One example of a definition for P(B|A) that obeys (18) but has columns that do not
sum to 1 can be obtained in the case of NA = NB by setting R equal to P(A|B)
T .
10 S.G. RODRIQUES
From (36), this is equivalent to the statement that
~P (A) = (RT )−1 ~P (B),
or equivalently,
(38) RT ~P (A) = ~P (B),
so R must itself be the transpose of a conditional probability distribu-
tion. The challenge is now to enumerate the set of matrices R that satisfy
both (35) and (38). We can categorize the choices by the order of their
dependency on P(A|B).
4.1. Zeroth-order axioms. It is possible to specify P(B|A) entirely inde-
pendently of P(A|B), while still satisfying both of the requirements of (18).
One such specification involves setting all of the columns of P(B|A) to be
equal to ~P (B), or equivalently, setting R−1 to be the matrix in which all of
the rows are given by ~P (A). However, this axiom is uninteresting from the
perspective of inference, since it is impossible to infer ~P (B) without knowing
~P (B) to begin with. The corresponding rule says, if ~P (B) is already known,
one can simply ignore all measurements.
4.2. First-order axioms. The set of first-order axioms is a one-dimensional
convex hull, the two extreme points of which form a conjugate pair. The first
extreme point is obtained by settingR equal to (P (A|B)T )−1. Applying (36),
we recover Bayes’ rule:
(39) P(B|A) = P(B)P(A|B)TP(A)−1.
The matrix P(B|A)T given in (39) also maps ~1B onto ~1A, and also satis-
fies (38), so it is also a candidate for R. This results in the second axiom:
(40) R = P(A)−1P(A|B)P(B)
Applying (36), we find the inversion rule,
(41) P(B|A) = P(A|B)−1.
The conjugacy of Bayes’ rule and the inversion rule is now obvious. Denoting
by RK the axiom specifying Bayes’ rule and by RI the axiom specifying the
inversion rule, we have
(42) P(B|A)TK = RI ,
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and likewise,
(43) P(B|A)TI = RK .
The set of all first-order axioms may then be obtained by noting that any
convex combination of first-order axioms is also a first-order axiom, so the
set of first-order axioms is a convex hull. Since there are no other matrix
functions first order in P (A|B) that obey (35) and (38), the entire set of
first-order axioms may be parametrized by
(44) R = pP(A)−1P(A|B)P(B) + (1− p)(P(A|B)T )−1,
for p ∈ [0, 1].
4.3. Higher-order Axioms. Just as any convex combination of R matri-
ces is also a R matrix, any product of R matrices and R-matrix inverses is a
R matrix as well. To see this, note that if R maps ~1B to ~1A, then R
−1 maps
~1A to ~1B . Likewise, if R
T maps ~P (A) to ~P (B), then (RT )−1 maps ~P (B) to
~P (A). The set of higher-order axioms may thus be generated by combining
different first-order R matrices in the pattern
(45) R = R1R
−1
2 R3 . . . ,
corresponding to the rule
(46) P(B|A) = P(B|A)1P(B|A)
−1
2 P(B|A)3,
where P(B|A)i is the conditional probability associated with Ri. Evidently,
rules only exist at odd orders, and clearly the set of nth-order rules is the
convex hull of the nth-order product set of the set of first-order rules. As an
example of a rule at higher-order, we have
R = RKR
−1
I RK
= (P(A|B)T )−1
(
P(B)−1P(A|B)−1P(A)
)
(P(A|B)T )−1,(47)
which implies
(48) P(B|A) = P(B)P(A|B)TP(A)−1P(A|B)P(B)P(A|B)TP(A)−1.
This particular rule has the property that it discounts the evidence in
favor of the prior and the model, as is evident from the fact that in this
system, P(B|A) depends only at first order on P(A), while it depends on
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P(B) at second order and P(A|B) at third order. Although it is more costly
to implement computationally, it also displays some properties that may be
useful for machine learning applications. For example, unlike for Bayes’ rule
or the inversion rule, the columns of P(B|A) will not in general sum to 1
unless the correct values of P(B) and P(A) are used in the calculation, thus
providing a test of convergence.
5. Conclusion. We have shown that the axiomatization of probability
theory in terms of set theory originally formulated by Kolmogorov imposes
strong conditions on the form of the reverse conditional probabilities. These
conditions ensure desirable properties required for consistency with the fre-
quentist interpretation of probability theory, including positivity and correct
behavior when P (A,B) is a product distribution or not invertible. However,
they are not necessary for correct statistical inference. Within a more gen-
eral axiomatization, one can use alternative rules for statistical inference
in parallel with Bayes’ rule, leading to unexpected new ways of performing
inference. As a result, alternative rules of inference may prove more useful
than Bayes’ rule for some applications.
In addition, we ask whether there may be physical circumstances in which
an alternative axiomatization of probability theory would be preferred to the
Kolmogorov theory. For example, it is known that although observable prob-
abilities are always positive, the underlying distributions describing quan-
tum mechanical states do not necessarily obey positivity Wigner [1932].
Indeed, the violation of positivity by quantum states has been shown to
be a fundamental distinguishing property of quantum mechanics Spekkens
[2008]. It may be that for describing these quantum mechanical probability
distributions, which are not necessarily subject to a standard frequentist
interpretation, an alternative axiomatization of probability is more suitable.
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